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Summary 
Recent conflicts over liberal conceptions of international order have reinvigorated the 
debate about the possibilities of global governance. Are liberal norms and rules such as 
the international Responsibility to Protect and criminal justice only accepted in the politi-
cal West? Are they acceptable in the “global South” at best in an adjusted form? Moreo-
ver, what are the sources of these intensified debates about international rules which had 
appeared to be already firmly institutionalized at the global level in the form of formal 
institutions and informal obligations?  
Two events that took place in 2011 illustrate what is at stake. In March that year the in-
ternational community authorized military action to protect individuals from, allegedly, 
eminent human rights abuses by the Libyan government. The UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 1973 to that effect and, in doing so, drew on the idea of the responsibil-
ity to protect (R2P). Though serving as an early supporter of the R2P and likewise con-
demning the human rights abuses by the Libyan government, the African Union (AU) 
harshly criticized the approach taken by the intervening coalition that implemented the 
resolution. It denounced coalition actions as a form of neo-colonial intervention and went 
on to distance itself from the R2P norm. This episode marked a historical turning point as 
the AU had been the first non-Western regional organization that had decisively support-
ed the R2P norm. At about the same time, UN forces were carrying out an intervention 
with the support of French troops in the Ivory Coast. Presidential elections there had 
contributed to the violent escalation of a power struggle between the incumbent president 
Laurent Gbagbo and his challenger Alassane Ouattara. The intervention, which eventually 
led to the overthrow and arrest of Gbagbo, was legitimized by a related protection norm: 
the obligation to protect civilians during peacekeeping missions (Protection of Civilians, 
POC). In contrast to the case of Libya, African regional organizations welcomed this in-
tervention and continued to support the POC norm in the period that ensued. 
Understanding these divergent responses by the AU to the application of presumably 
global norms will help in assessing the future possibilities for global security governance 
resting on a shared set of normative standards. The present report uses two lenses to ex-
amine the AU’s responses. It first focuses on the relationship between global institutions 
and Regional Security Organizations (RSOs). Though the rapid growth of such organiza-
tions since the 1990s has often been dismissed, it has, in fact, established new structures in 
world politics. RSOs have come to take on a series of tasks on behalf of their members. 
They primarily serve as “amplifiers” that strengthen the position of their members in the 
continued development of global norms, and, concurrently, serve as “gatekeepers” for 
controlling the implementation of global norms in their constituent regions. The friction 
points between global institutions and regional organizations constitute the areas in 
which we can most readily observe conflicts about the norms of global governance. The 
role of RSOs in these conflicts is ambivalent. Are they leading to a fragmentation of the 
global order? Or should they be seen as building blocks of a world order that increase the 
opportunities for global governance? 
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The German federal government emphasizes the latter, the inherent potential of RSOs 
for supporting a global order. It insists that RSOs can contribute to creating stability in 
their regions, reducing the burden on Europe and other Western global powers. Conse-
quently, the German government seeks to support the work of RSOs. Given the contro-
versies surrounding the impact of RSOs on global norms, however, it is unclear whether 
this is a contribution to the stabilization or to the fragmentation of global order. What is 
central for resolving this issue is the question under what conditions regional actors ac-
cept emerging global organizations and under which conditions they reject them.  
In approaching this question, we argue, secondly, that the regional acceptance or rejec-
tion of global rules by states is essentially a matter of justice. Global institutions are only 
accepted when they and the distribution patterns they generate are taken to be just by the 
affected states. In order to substantiate why international actors insist on the presence of 
just order and fair treatment and to uncover what justice actually means for the actors, we 
draw from the results of empirical research on justice. The substantive meaning of justice, 
i.e. what it means for a concrete actor to be treated in a just way, is informed to a consid-
erable degree by historical and social contexts. At a basic level, however, some general 
criteria for justice can be identified, e.g. that equals be treated equally. Furthermore, there 
are two dimensions of justice that can universally be distinguished: distributive and pro-
cedural justice. While the former refers to the distribution of material and immaterial 
goods, risks and costs, the latter refers to the quality of the procedures that lead to deci-
sions on such distribution. Procedural justice may, for example, require that those who 
are affected by a decision have a say when the decision is being made. Procedural justice 
can be considered the more decisive of the two because it can make decisions acceptable 
whose distributive effects are difficult to predict or evaluate. 
We will illustrate the significance of justice, particularly procedural justice, within in-
ternational politics by examining the aforementioned divergent reactions on the part of 
the African Union during the first application of both the R2P and the POC norms. These 
reactions cannot merely be explained by differences in the content of the norms or by 
their (mis)match with African traditions and interests. Rather, a justice-based approach 
points to the differing opportunities for participation that existed in both cases. While the 
AU was marginalized in the decision-making process for the military implementation of 
Resolution 1973, the subregional organization ECOWAS (Economic Community of West 
African States) and the AU both assumed important roles in deciding on military actions 
in the Ivory Coast. 
This diagnosis has far-reaching implications for practice. A global order that is in-
formed by liberal institutions must satisfy demands for justice in order to be acceptable. 
This does not only concern the distribution of burdens, risks, costs and benefits. It also 
includes possibilities for co-determination when norms are applied in concrete situations. 
From this perspective, involvement of regional organizations would not undermine the 
substance of a global order. On the contrary, the devolution of responsibility at the re-
gional level increases the possibilities for global governance. The regionalization of the 
architecture of global governance, for which the founding conference of the UN in San 
Francisco had called already in 1944, seems to be more pertinent than ever. 
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1. The paradox: divergent reactions to emerging global norms 
by regional security organizations 
Emerging global norms and rules1 of liberal origin are not easily accepted at the local le-
vel. Two similar events in 2011 highlight the need to reconsider the relation between glo-
bal norms and their local acceptance. As the present report argues, institutional justice 
must assume a more significant place in such a process. 
In April of 2011, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973 with a large majori-
ty. Relying on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm for the first time, this resolution 
authorized the use of force to protect people from grave crimes committed by their gov-
ernment – in this case Libya. This decision was initially supported by all regionally affect-
ed states on the Security Council. Following the vote however, the African Union broke 
with the consensus under the leadership of the non-permanent Security Council member 
South Africa and emphatically rejected the implementation of the resolution by a coali-
tion of willing states. South Africa criticized their approach as a form of neo-colonial in-
terference and went on to distance itself from the R2P norm. 
At around the same time, a UN force supported by French troops stationed in the Ivo-
ry Coast appealed to a related norm: an obligation to the Protection of Civilians (POC) 
during peacekeeping missions. The intention here was to use military force to intervene 
in the violent power struggle that had emerged in the wake of the 2010 presidential elec-
tions. Incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo was to be removed from power and arrested 
and his challenger Alassane Ouattara was to be put in office. As in the case of R2P, the AU 
was involved in developing the POC norm from the beginning. However, this time, the 
AU continued to support the norm after it had been applied for the first time and would 
later refer to the POC in justifying the deployment and robust actions of a UN interven-
tion force in eastern Congo in 2012.  
The first situation was picked up by the press and intensely debated in academia. In-
deed, Africa’s change of course in the R2P case can be considered highly significant for 
the fate of global governance. Africa was the first non-Western region to embrace the R2P 
most clearly. Given that other regions remained skeptical of or even outright rejected the 
R2P, the entrenchment of the responsibility to protect in article 4(h) of the Constitutive 
Act of the African Union from July 2000 appeared to indicate that core liberal norms of 
global governance might also achieve recognition in the non-Western world. Conse-
quently, Africa’s turn away from this principle was taken to be a historical turning point 
in the debate about global governance. It appeared not only to herald the end of the R2P 
(Rieff 2011, see also Hofmann 2014:17; Benner et al. 2015) but also to represent the emer-
gence of a front of resistance on the part of non-Western regions to principles of liberal 
 
1 In what follows, we will use the terms norms and rules interchangeably, conceiving of norms as agreed-
upon rules and not in their original sociological definition as expressions of moral necessities and largely 
unquestioned codes of behavior. 
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order. This skepticism was presumably confirmed by a similar development with respect 
to international criminal justice and the liberal norms associated with it. An arrest war-
rant issued for Sudanese president Al Bashir garnered intense opposition in Africa. It 
prompted the AU to give up its support for the International Criminal Court and even led 
to the establishment of an African version of international criminal justice. During the 
crisis in Libya, the AU explicitly requested its member states to ignore the arrest warrant 
against Muammar al-Gaddafi. 
Might there be a pattern here? Is the African Union becoming the grounds and the in-
strument for resistance to a world order shaped by liberal institutions? Might African 
states and their regional organizations even have deliberately created the appearance of 
accepting liberal global norms for instrumental reasons and revealed their true positions 
once the norm was first applied in practice? The Ivory Coast case does, however, indicate 
that we are not dealing with such a pattern and that sweeping and pessimistic conclusions 
about African resistance to a liberal global order are premature. Reactions to the emer-
gence of global norms on the part of local and regional actors have clearly varied.  
What, then, affects the position of local actors towards global norms? In our case, the 
answer to this question needs to account for the variation in the African Union’s behav-
ior, i.e. explain why it initially supported two related global protection norms, only to 
distance itself from the R2P upon its first application while continuing to support the 
POC. 
Both cases reveal an additional similarity. In both situations regional security organi-
zations played a decisive role. Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams (2011: 847) have character-
ized the functions of the Arabic League in the case of Libya and that of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the case of the Ivory Coast as those of 
“gatekeepers”: Their consent to the interventions allowed global protection norms to be 
implemented in the first place. This illustrates the rising importance of regional security 
organizations for the architecture of global governance. Since the end of the 1990s, many 
regional organizations whose focus had originally been on economic cooperation – such 
as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) – have begun to develop their 
capacities in the area of security, while others – such as the Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR) – have been created with the explicit goal of coordinating security 
policies (Kirchner/Dominguez 2011; Aris/Wenger 2014). According to a recent figure, 
over 30 RSOs currently deal with various aspects of maintaining security in their regions 
(Wallensteen/Bjurner 2015). According to the concept of ‘new regionalism’, their growth 
can be seen as a reaction to normative adjustment pressures, which have surfaced along 
with the restructuring of the global order from one of sovereign equality to that of a liber-
al peace. Bellamy and Williams’s analysis is incomplete, however, because they only look 
at RSOs as facilitators. Regional organizations can surely be put to use by their members 
in order to take advantage of global norms. They can, however, likewise be employed in 
order to shield these states from normative pressures at the global level. RSOs are thus 
increasingly important as interfaces between the global and the state level. They can serve 
as instruments for their members to influence normative developments at the global level. 
And they can function as filters that allow, deny or adjust to the implementation of global 
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rules. As such, our two-sided puzzle is representative of a more general question: Under 
which conditions do RSOs accept and serve as the building blocks of emerging global 
norms and under which conditions do they stand in opposition to such norms, thereby 
acting as barriers to global governance? 
We argue that justice plays a key role in this process. At first glance, it might appear 
far-fetched to assume that an empirically oriented theory of institutional justice could 
clarify our current puzzle and, moreover, increase our understanding of conflicts involv-
ing global norms and their regional validity. Such a theory has not been developed as of 
yet. In marked contrast to exhaustive research in the area of political theory and the new 
sub-discipline of international political theory (Wisotzki 2013), there exist, at best, only a 
handful of studies that focus on international justice from an empirical perspective 
(Welch 1993; Müller/Druckman 2014). Even though the term justice has made an appear-
ance in nearly all keynote speeches addressing the global order, it remains unclear what 
the term implies for world politics, whether a shared understanding of justice exists, and 
whether it is something that motivates the actions of political decision-makers and is a 
goal that they actively pursue. The situation in the neighboring fields of social psychology, 
organizational research, experimental economics and evolutionary research is quite dif-
ferent. Empirical justice research is firmly established in these disciplines. Here, countless 
experiments and comprehensive field research have shown that the actions of individual 
actors are not merely dictated by their short-term interests or cost-benefit calculations but 
equally by their desires for justice. Even though these findings cannot simply be carried 
over to the area of international politics as is, the development of an international theory 
of institutional justice may stand to benefit by borrowing from research in neighboring 
disciplines. 
Against this background, the present study has two primary goals. First, it intends to 
establish a basic conception of international institutional justice by drawing from empiri-
cal justice research carried out in other disciplines. Second, it aims to demonstrate that 
such a conception can lead to a more complete understanding of how regional actors 
relate to norms for global governance. 
This theoretical perspective on the politics of order entails far-reaching political impli-
cations. They concern the modalities of political control efforts, in general, and the rela-
tionship between global and regional structures of order, in particular, which is currently 
intensely debated. In its official position, the German Federal Government has empha-
sized the inherent potential of RSOs for establishing global order. At the Commanders’ 
Conference at Strasbourg in October 2012, for example, Angela Merkel stated that NATO 
and the EU could not alone solve all the problems related to security. Regional powers, 
especially regional organizations, should acquire more responsibility and be enabled to  
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more effectively assume this role.2 Based on a German initiative, the European Council 
took up this suggestion in a consultation on EU defense policies in December 2013. It 
subsequently passed the Enable and Enhance Initiative (E2I) that aims at strengthening 
the capacities of other regional organizations in the area of conflict prevention (Puglierin 
et al. 2014). The EU can thereby expand its existing programs that support organizations 
such as the African Union. These include its African Peace Facility (APF) through which 
the AU’s peacekeeping missions are co-financed. It might appear that through such 
mechanisms extra-European regional organizations (e.g. the AU) allow themselves to be 
instrumentalized in order for the West to more efficiently attain its goals. Upon first in-
spection, such a view might have some merit. Why would Germany and the EU support 
strengthening RSOs if this entails limiting European influenced and making way for solu-
tions to regional problems that do not accord to European views? In contrast, institution-
al justice would deem such an instrumentalized understanding as short-sighted. Instead, 
and in accordance with the central argument of this report, RSOs can best contribute to 
stabilizing the global order when they are fairly involved in this order. 
2. The explanation: procedural justice as the key to understanding 
the possibilities for global governance 
2.1. Conventional explanations for the regional acceptance of global norms: 
theories of socialization and localization 
In order to clarify the specific perspective and special contribution of empirical theories of 
justice to global governance research, we will first briefly introduce the theories of 
socialization and localization – two theoretical concepts that have thus far dominated 
debates on the local recognition of global norms. Adherents of socialization theories take 
modern, successful and efficient actors to be the driving force lying at the core of the 
implementation of global standards. Socialization theories relativize earlier assumptions 
of an automatic diffusion of efficient and modern forms of organization by placing more 
weight on the influence of actors and on the significance of instrumental action. In the 
end, however, structural factors tend to be decisive for the success of socialization. Besides 
the attractiveness and the strength of the agents of socialization – i.e. their ability to create 
 
2  See: Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel anlässlich der Tagung des zivilen und militärischen 
Spitzenpersonals der Bundeswehr in der Akademie der Bundeswehr für Information und Kommuni-
kation, 22 October 2012, available at: http://bit.ly/1gMbfZW (18 November 2014). Merkel made a similar 
statement during a press conference at the European Council in December 2013. She expressed the goal of 
“working towards a situation in which European states would not always have to intervene on their own 
but rather enable regional organizations so that they may support security in individual regions” (press 
conference of Chancellor Merkel at a meeting of the European Council, 20 December 2013; our transla-
tion). 
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positive or negative sanctions – it is the normative match between the new norms and the 
existing local practices and thus the cost of adjustment which affects the success of 
socialization (Checkel 2005: 806–808). In this context, the mode of socialization extends 
from strategic calculations through role playing all the way up to persuasion (Schimmel-
fennig 2002: 11–13). Despite attempts to develop more differentiated concepts, 
representatives of this theory ultimately adhere to a linear process of norm diffusion, a 
process that progresses from inception through a gradual dissemination and up to a 
certain tipping point. Thereafter, norm entrepreneurs carry the process forward by way of 
strategic engagement until those targeted finally internalize the norms (Finnemore/ 
Sikkink 1998; critique: Daase 2013).  
In contrast, localization theories – particularly those developed by Amitav Acharya – 
place greater emphasis on the character of actors, such as the autonomy and strategic 
capabilities held by the objects of socialization efforts. Local actors have been shown to 
respond both creatively and instrumentally to global norms. Depending on how global 
norms relate to a ‘cognitive prior’ (Acharya 2004) – namely, the preexisting traditions, 
mentalities and interests (of the elites) –, local states will reject them, accept them or ad-
just them to their needs.  
Though both theories take differing stances on the assertiveness, autonomy and crea-
tivity possessed by agents and objects of socialization, they agree on two central points. 
The normative match – the accord between the contents of global norms and local tradi-
tions and interests – is considered to be the essential condition for either acceptance or 
rejection. Furthermore, total acceptance is viewed as improbable. Whereas localization 
theories assume that adjusting norms to existing local traditions and practices is a more 
likely outcome, socialization theories argue that strategic adjustment and role playing are, 
at least in the first stage of the process, more likely than internalization. The differentia-
tion between the substance of a norm (in terms of the general and abstract rules it embod-
ies) and its application in a concrete situation is also prominent in recent research on 
norms. This research has demonstrated that conflicts typically break out when abstract 
rules are applied in practice. When such disputes relate to the question of application 
itself – whether or not the rules suit the practical case – they will usually result in specifi-
cation of the rules. Should, on the other hand, disputes of application uncover hidden 
differences in regards to definitions of the general rules, the norm may very well break 
apart (Betts/Orchard 2014). Applied to the African position towards R2P, both approach-
es would argue that the markedly negative reaction to the norm’s first application high-
lights clear differences in the interpretation of what R2P actually entails. Accordingly, 
though the AU paid lip service to R2P early on for its own, and assumedly, instrumental 
reasons, its member states held a fundamentally different understanding of the concept 
compared to their Western counterparts who implemented Resolution 1973. Localization 
theories would presume the existence of differences over the content between the AU and 
the international community with respect to questions of sovereignty – particularly in 
relation to the issue of whether the R2P can legitimize emergency measures against in-
cumbent governments that do not meet their obligation to protect. Applied to the African 
position towards the POC, both approaches would argue that the match between the def-
inition of global norms and local traditions and interests was better, and, accordingly, that 
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the first attempted application of the norm served to specify mutual understandings of its 
contents. Differing reactions to both norms on the part of the AU would be explained by 
their content and integrability in relation to local interests. 
2.2. Empirical justice research as a basis for a theory of institutional justice 
in international relations 
As touched upon in the introduction, empirical justice research emerged within the area 
of social psychology in the 1950s, and subsequently gained a foothold in other areas of the 
social sciences such as organizational research and experimental economics. This research 
focuses on perceptions of justice in social relations and institutions. It starts out from a 
conception of justice as a particular distribution of goods and rights: A just distribution is 
one that accords actors what they deserve. Moreover, justice means that equals are treated 
equally and unequals unequally. Accordingly, injustice lies in the arbitrary, unequal 
treatment of equivalent demands as well as in the difference between agreed-upon rules 
and actual conduct. Unlike philosophy, empirical justice research is not interested in 
developing well-reasoned standards of justice. Rather, it examines what real-world actors 
perceive as just or unjust and how this affects their behavior. We cannot elaborate here on 
the current status of this line of research in any depth but will only briefly highlight three 
central findings that are important for informing research about institutional justice in 
the international realm.  
First, social psychological research – particularly the work by John S. Adams and the 
equity theory that he developed – demonstrates that the justice motif can be isolated from 
interests. Actors do not only follow direct cost-benefit calculations. Rather, perceptions of 
justice likewise have an influence on their actions (Adams 1965). Justice, and especially 
the recognition of injustice, even motivate actions to a particularly large degree. A percep-
tion of justice is closely related to socially oriented behavior and encourages the willing-
ness of individuals to voluntarily contribute to the production of collective goods. Actors 
often respond to perceived injustice through negative actions such as protests, refusal to 
cooperate, sabotage and depression. In short, the behavior of real people does not corre-
spond to the assumptions made by models of rational and self-interested actors developed 
by economists. Rather, people appear to be a hybrid species, “a cross-breed of H. 
economicus and H. emoticus [italics in the original], a complicated hybrid species that 
can be ruled as much by emotions as by cold logic and selfishness” (Sigmund et al. 2002: 
84).  
Second, empirical justice research has come up with different explanations for why 
justice is a central concern for individuals. One model starts from the assumption that 
self-interested actors are dependent on cooperation in order to achieve their goals. Ac-
cording to this model, justice is a shared standard that allows the members of a communi-
ty to socially organize themselves in such a way that they may maximize their utility by 
acting as competitors in cooperation with others. As such, justice is important in so far as 
it regulates social interactions (Tyler/Smith 1998: 612). According to a second model de-
Institutional Justice and the Regional Acceptance of Global Order 7
 
 
veloped by Tom Tyler and Allan Lind on the basis of social identity theory, justice is de-
fined as a standard that offers those involved the relevant information about their social 
status within a given group. This group-value model assumes that actors value social 
recognition and assess their status within a group based on how others, particularly au-
thority figures, treat them. It is, of course, doubtful whether these models can be neatly 
separated when they are applied to empirical phenomena. Experimental economics show 
that individuals oppose unfair treatment even when this proves adverse to their short-
term interests. They suppose that protest serves to maintain their feelings of self-worth, as 
suggested by the group-value model. But research further indicates that this need to pro-
tect feelings of self-worth is part of a behavioral program through which actors arm them-
selves against the risk of future exploitation by self-interested others. “From an evolution-
ary viewpoint, this self-esteem is an internal device for acquiring a reputation, which is 
beneficial in future encounters” (Sigmund et al. 2002: 85).  
Third, and especially interesting for us, empirical justice research establishes a differ-
ence between two dimensions of justice: distributive justice and procedural justice. Dis-
tributive justice exists when members of a social group are convinced that the allotment 
of a given good within the group corresponds to standards shared by the group. This need 
not necessarily be a standard of equality. Distributive justice can also be based on stand-
ards of need, of seniority or of the proportion of effort. Justice is realized when the suum 
cuique principle is satisfied, when each person receives their deserved share. Procedural 
justice is a characteristic of the decision-making processes that leads to the distribution of 
goods. The pioneers of research into procedural justice, social psychologist John Thibaut 
and lawyer Laurens Walker, investigated the conditions under which judicial proceedings 
and the resulting judgments were deemed as fair by those concerned. In more general 
terms, procedural justice refers to the fairness of the processes of applying a general rule 
(the law) to a concrete case. Thibaut and Walker assumed that the so-called “process con-
trol” (or ”voice”) of those affected increases the acceptance of a judgment. Here, process 
control refers specifically to “control over the development and selection of information 
that will constitute the basis for resolving the conflict” (Thibaut/Walker 1975: 546). The 
prescriptive model developed by Gerald Leventhal is even broader (1980). Leventhal de-
veloped a catalog of qualities that any given procedure must fulfill in order to be deemed 
fair. These include consistency in the application of general rules, the impartiality of deci-
sion-making bodies, and the accuracy of information flowing into the procedure.  
In sum, this research finds that perceptions of injustice can surface at two points: ei-
ther a general rule or an isolated decision made on the basis of that rule can be found to 
be unjust. In established communities at least, justice disputes relating to general rules are 
rather unlikely and justice conflicts will generally revolve around individual decisions. 
This is not all too surprising considering that conflicts over application are not only more 
frequent but also more complex. In each case, a decision must be reached as to which rule 
should be applied and what it prescribes in that concrete case. When judging the justice of 
an individual decision, those concerned not only evaluate the distributive effect of that 
decision on the basis of their conceptions of just allotment but likewise the procedure that 
led to that decision. The affected parties are more likely to accept a concrete judgment 
when they perceive the procedure involved in making that decision as fair. Subsequent 
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empirical studies confirmed the assumption that procedural justice operates independent 
of outcomes. Evidently, justice deficits in the distributive dimension can be compensated 
for by strengths in the procedural dimension (Greenberg 1990: 406). 
Overall, then, empirical justice research postulates that people are evolutionarily out-
fitted with a perception of justice. This allows members of a community to acquire and 
share specific standards of justice and permits interactions among members of this com-
munity to operate free of friction. The recognition of a concrete distributive decision as 
being just or unjust not only depends on the distribution itself but also on the fairness of 
the procedure that led to this decision.  
Can the results of this research, which focus on the behavior of individuals, be trans-
ferred to the inter-state arena? This will depend on the answer to two questions: (a) Do 
dispositions and perceptions of individuals influence the behavior of large groups and of 
states? How reliable are the mechanisms of transfer from the individual to the group lev-
el?; and (b) Given that justice is a shared standard within communities, why would repre-
sentatives of states apply justice standards in inter-state relations even though the level of 
cultural and social integration within the international system is markedly lower than 
within historically evolved communities? 
The first question is currently being extensively discussed in the theory of internation-
al relations by research that examines the broader significance of individual dispositions 
and experiences – such as emotions (Mercer 2010; 2013), humiliation (Saurette 2006) and 
respect (Wolf 2011; Ward 2013) – for state behavior. This research has highlighted two 
causal mechanisms for the transfer of individual dispositions to state behavior. First, deci-
sion makers can conceive of the state system as a social system and determine the status of 
their own state based on how it is treated by representatives of other states. Second, mem-
bers of a large group or state who identify with that group or state may project the exist-
ent individual and acknowledged justice principles onto relations between larger groups 
or states. Socio-psychological justice research has also produced empirical indications 
that individuals transfer perceptions of justice onto large social groups and that they hold 
expectation that their own social groups will be treated justly in relation to others. 
Empirical justice research also offers answers to the second question. Field research 
has already confirmed the assumption that justice carries universal significance but that 
concrete expectations related to justice are shaped by communal experiences (Henrich et 
al. 2004). The current state of research on the question of whether justice is universal or 
culturally determined has been summarized by Tom Tyler and Heather Smith (1998: 
619): “Most studies support the suggestion that justice is important across cultural set-
tings. However, this research also suggests that people do not necessarily define justice in 
the same way.” Research has, however, also shown that the boundaries of communal per-
ceptions and expectations of justice can neither be definitively demarcated nor are they 
immutable. On the one hand, communities draw a distinction with respect to the people 
whom justice must serve, members of the group or outsiders. This differentiation is not, 
however, absolute and communities are prepared to afford justice to outsiders, though 
perhaps to a lesser degree than to insiders. They are less willing to share communal goods 
but do take the basic rights of outsiders into consideration. On the other hand, the 
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boundaries of justice vary based on the social interactions involved. It seems quite likely 
that globalization is shifting the boundaries of where people are aware of and expect jus-
tice. Justice is gaining in significance as a global and inter-state phenomenon due to an 
increase in transnational interactions and externalities. 
In sum, there is good reason to believe that the justice motif is increasingly playing a 
role in interactions between states; that states expect to be treated justly by other states, 
i.e. that they expect to receive what they are entitled to; and finally that individuals can 
also be recognized as subjects of justice in inter-state relations. At the same time, however, 
one can rightly expect shared perceptions of justice within the international arena to be 
weaker than in culturally homogenous communities that have historically evolved. In the 
national arena, shared expectations of justice represent a resource that allows conflicts 
about individual decisions to be resolved discursively. In the international arena, justice 
disputes over the distributive effects of single decisions are far more likely to impact the 
rules informing these decisions. This makes the procedural dimension all the more crucial 
and renders the acceptance of general rules all the more dependent on procedural fair-
ness. 
Given these findings, how would empirical justice theory interpret our cases? The 
starting point here would also be the difficulty of moving from the general rule to its ap-
plication in an individual case. The application is particularly meaningful in the cases of 
R2P and POC. When applied they can have significant impact on states because they limit 
the rights of states in varying ways. Moreover, as they are still young norms, their inter-
pretations are not yet settled and every instance, in which they are applied will contribute 
to how they will be interpreted in the future. Unlike socialization and localization theo-
ries, justice theories do not assume a straightforward link between the contents of a norm 
and its application. Rather, an abstract rule can be differently applied to a concrete case. 
The procedural dimension is variable. Whether or not a decision in a case is accepted will 
be significantly affected by how fair the procedures of application are perceived to be.  
A justice-based explanation of our cases would entail two expectations. First, we would 
expect that the AU placed particular importance on procedural aspects during discussions 
regarding both the R2P and the POC. Second, we would expect that the different reac-
tions of the AU in both cases did not – or at least not primarily – have to do with the con-
tents of the norms, i.e. with any underlying differences between the AU and the interna-
tional community as to their meaning, but rather with the differing opportunities for AU 
participation. Where the AU sees itself unfairly excluded from decision-making over how 
a general rule is applied in a concrete case, dissatisfaction with the unfairness of the 
treatment should become visible in the AU’s rhetoric, in defiant behavior and a dissocia-
tion from the content of the norm in question. Where procedures for deciding about the 
application of a norm are considered fair, in contrast, this would be expected to increase 
the norm’s acceptance among African states. 
In the following section, we investigate the reactions to both protection norms by Afri-
can states in order to determine whether the differing reactions are better explained by 
the normative match, as suggested by socialization and localization approaches, or by 
perceptions of procedural fairness, as justice theory would hold. 
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3. The cases: justice theory and the African Union’s position on 
global protection norms  
3.1. The African Union and the Responsibility to Protect 
As mentioned in the introduction, the African Union incorporated the idea of the 
responsibility to protect in its Constitutive Act as early as July 2000. Article 4(h) of this 
unusual document grants the Union the right to intervene during serious crises in a 
member state, such as defending against war crimes, genocide and human rights violati-
ons. Should unanimity minus one not be achieved, a decision to intervene is made by the 
AU General Assembly through a two-thirds majority vote by the member states – without 
the government in question holding a veto right. This indicated that the establishment of 
the AU in 2001 as the successor organization to the discredited Organization for African 
Unity (OAU) was accompanied by a normative shift from a culture of non-intervention 
to one of non-indifference (Murithi 2009; Williams 2007). It appeared that Africa and 
African states were not only accepting Western norms but also that a normative shift in 
the global order from one based on state sovereignty to one based on principles of liberal 
peace was actively being promoted by the new organization. Some observers 
optimistically commented that the R2P was a “norm born out of Africa” (Williams 2009: 
397). 
The AU’s acknowledgement of the responsibility to protect certainly was surprising. 
For one, the OAU had previously emphasized traditional principles such as non-
intervention, sovereignty and uti possidetis, compromising with the power interests of 
African potentates. And, secondly, many African states continued to be ruled by authori-
tarian regimes and, due to inherent weakness and diverse internal conflicts, had the po-
tential to quickly become the sites of serious conflicts and the targets of humanitarian 
intervention. By accepting the responsibility to protect and the associated dismantling of 
normative protections against external intervention, AU member states were willingly 
accepting these risks. Given the inequality between African states that were the potential 
objects of humanitarian protection and those states with the military capacity to inter-
vene, this represented a dangerous gateway for external interventions on the African con-
tinent.  
Consequently, article 4(h) was much debated during the founding of the AU and a 
number of states continue to hold a skeptical position towards the new principle. The fact 
that this departure from the principle of state sovereignty was successful at all is tied to 
the shock of the situation in Rwanda. Foreign policy elites and many African decision-
makers came to two conclusions as a result of the genocide: First, a crime of this sort 
could never be repeated and, second, Africa could not count on the international com-
munity to take quick military action when it came to protecting the lives of Africans. Ad-
ditionally, South Africa and Nigeria also actively contributed to the shift. The govern-
ments of both countries came to promote the establishment of liberal norms in the AU’s 
constitution based on their own convictions and on strategic calculations. Supporting the 
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shift helped them to demonstrate the liberal leanings of their policies to both their popu-
laces and international observers (Tieku 2004). In order to make the R2P more palatable 
and to pass it against opposing opinions, they appealed to the existing continental norms 
of Pan-Africanism and traditional expectations to demonstrate solidarity with oppressed 
African brothers (Adebajo 2010: 417; in summary see Dembinski/Schott 2014: 371–74; for 
a background on African decision-making processes see Williams 2011: 155).  
The African protagonists of the responsibility to protect did, however, make their ac-
ceptance dependent on one central condition. They insisted that the African Union alone 
would decide on the application of the protection norm in Africa, and not the interna-
tional community or the UN Security Council. Article 4(h) explicitly granted the right of 
intervention to the AU, not to the UN Security Council. The Ezulwini Consensus from 
2005, through which the AU prepared its position for the World Summit, reinforced sup-
port for the R2P but likewise insisted that only regional organizations would decide on 
interventions in their respective regions. Agreement from the Security Council was desir-
able but could be granted “after the fact”.3 This condition also is linked to elements of an 
African security culture, namely the concept of Africa establishing its own peace. Against 
the background of colonialism and neo-colonial interventions, this concept draws a nor-
mative distinction between interventions in Africa by African and by extra-continental 
powers. The latter were deemed as illegitimate and the former as legitimate so long as 
they served Pan-African interests (Mazrui 1967: 203f). Interventions by extra-continental 
powers were considered problematic since they could lead to foreign domination and 
exploitation. Accordingly, giving the AU’s decision priority was originally designed as a 
defensive move. The purpose was not to prohibit extra-continental powers from interven-
ing to protect against grave human rights violations altogether but rather to enable Afri-
can participation and control capacities in order to prevent potential abuses of interven-
tions. Though the AU did acknowledge the principle of R2P and accepted the fact that 
extra-continental assistance would be necessary to protect African lives, it also insisted on 
controlling this extra-continental assistance. Along with this, the condition also had an 
enabling function. It was designed to ensure – against the background of the Rwanda 
experience – that Africa could solve its problems on its own without international sup-
port, which it deemed to be unreliable, and without a mandate from the Security Council.  
In practice, recognition of the responsibility to protect did certainly remain incon-
sistent after 2005 and the AU continued to maneuver between the principles of non-
indifference and non-intervention. African states rarely managed to find a unified posi-
tion in ensuing crisis situations. Though their reaction to the crisis in Darfur reflected a 
new sensibility towards abuses of power by states, it also revealed existing reservations in 
taking action against incumbent governments or calling out their crimes (Kieh 2013). In 
response to the crisis in Libya, three positions formed: South Africa, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Ghana and, to a certain degree, Tanzania and Benin were the supporters of the R2P, the 
Arabic States in North Africa along with Zimbabwe comprised the opposing camp, and 
 
3  Ext/EX-CL/2 (VII) (2005), B.i. 
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the rest of the states positioned themselves somewhere in the middle of these two poles 
(Williams 2009: 414f). Yet (when disregarding the camp of radical critics that held mar-
ginal positions in the development of the R2P as well as in decision-making about the 
response to concrete crises), differences in interpreting the R2P among AU member states 
were hardly any greater than those within the EU. In sum, the Responsibility to Protect as 
it is codified in the AU Constitutive Act represents a compromise between conflicting 
interests, requests and concerns. There is, however, little to suggest that accepting the 
shift from the principle of non-intervention to that of non-indifference was instrumental 
in nature. On the contrary, the African conception developed in accordance with the 
normative shift in the global order. 
This attempt to establish the Responsibility to Protect and to use procedural mecha-
nisms to minimize the risks of exploitation was put to the test during the crisis in Libya. 
As violence on the part of the Libyan government against its populace escalated in Febru-
ary 2011, the AU stood in line with the international community. When announcing its 
first official position on 23 February, the Union sharply criticized the actions of the Liby-
an government.4 As the conflict assumed the contours of an armed confrontation between 
the Gaddafi regime and the opposition in Benghazi, the AU drafted a road map for resolv-
ing the crisis during a follow-up meeting on 10 March. This document envisaged an im-
mediate end to the fighting, the introduction of international humanitarian aid, the pro-
tection of civilians and African “guest workers”, and the commencement of negotiations 
between the conflicting parties in regards to political reforms and the country’s democra-
tization.5 The three African countries with a seat on the Security Council – South Africa, 
Nigeria and Gabon – supported Resolution 1970 without reservations. After an initial 
period of hesitation, South Africa decided to also support Resolution 1973 on 17 March 
2011, therewith ensuring a majority for the resolution as the two other African states fol-
lowed Pretoria’s lead (Adler-Nissen/Pouliot 2014: 904). Representatives from the African 
states reasoned that the no-fly zone would protect civilians. Moreover, this would create 
additional diplomatic pressure on Gaddafi’s regime and strengthen the AU’s position as a 
mediator as well as the possibilities for negotiating a peaceful resolution to the conflict. To 
achieve this, the AU put together a high-ranking ad hoc group at the meeting on 10 
March that was set to travel to Libya and initiate talks. Up to this point, the African states 
along with the AU found themselves sharing the international consensus of implementing 
the R2P in Libya and were apparently also in accordance with the views of the Western 
initiators of Resolution 1973. The latter even approved a passage in paragraph 2 of the 
resolution explicitly mentioning the planned dispatch of an AU delegation to Libya with 
the goal of finding a peaceful resolution to the crisis. 
Accord between the AU and the initiators of Resolution 1973 gave way to dissonance 
as soon as the first bombs fell on 19 March 2011. The coalition of willing states had closed 
 
4  African Union, Communiqué of the 261st Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, PSC/PR/COMM 
(CCLXI), Addis Ababa, 23 February 2011. 
5  African Union, Communiqué of the 265th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, PSC/PR/COMM.2 
(CCLXV), Addis Ababa, 10 March 2011. 
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Libyan airspace, thereby blocking the AU’s mission. Once the ad hoc group was finally 
able to enter in April, it became clear that their negotiation recommendation did not fail 
on account of opposition from Gaddafi but rather from the National Transitional Council 
in Benghazi. According to their interpretation, the air war had consolidated the dis-
missive position of the rebels. The Transitional Council had gained military high ground 
due to air support from the coalition and now hoped that they could win the conflict mili-
tarily. The coalition’s official position and the way that it had conducted military action 
proved that this hope was not ill-placed.6 The clearer it became that the coalition’s inter-
vention would de facto lead to a forced regime change, the more the AU distanced itself 
from the coalition and became disenchanted with the R2P principle it had supported be-
fore.  
Reactions to the intervention in Libya by African states clearly brought existing differ-
ences to the fore. While Nigeria and Rwanda seemed to harbor a degree of understanding 
for the coalition’s actions, rejection was the most pronounced in countries such as South 
Africa and Uganda.7 More important, however, were the similarities. A large majority of 
AU member states were in agreement that African rights had simply been ignored and 
that their efforts to find a peaceful solution were undermined through the actions of the 
coalition.  
Taken together, these observations do not support the assumption that the AU and 
Western backers of the R2P had drifted apart after the crisis in Libya due to any underly-
ing differences as to the content or meaning of the protection norm that would have sur-
faced upon the norm’s first application. The crisis in Libya certainly did, again, demon-
strate the existence of African reservations regarding military action against established 
governments (Omorogbe 2012). However, the critics of intervention by the West were 
not opposed to Gaddafi’s overthrow in principle. African nationalist and Ugandan Presi-
dent Yoweri Museveni stressed the right of the Libyan opposition to resist, merely criti-
cizing the interference by extra-continental actors. As the leading voice in the AU mis-
sion, it was also South Africa’s diplomatic intention to bring about Gaddafi’s departure by 
making use of the road map (McKaiser 2011). As such, the AU’s recommendation for 
resolving the crisis was operating within the boundaries of what one might have rightly 
expected to also be the basis of a Western understanding of the R2P in a case such as this.  
The decisive root of the conflict was the way in which Resolution 1973 was imple-
mented and how this served to marginalize the AU. With their right to participation and 
control ignored and the AU’s efforts undermined, perceptions held by African actors 
were reflected in harsh and defiant reactions as well as statements by leading AU repre-
sentatives and countries such as South Africa. This sheds light on the significance of the 
justice motif and the awareness of unjust treatment.  
 
6  Global Centre for the Responsibility-to-Protect: Libya and the R2P, Occasional Papers, October 2012: 12f. 
7  See Paul Kagame, Intervening in Libya Was the Right Thing to Do, New African, 1 May 2011. 
14 Matthias Dembinski/Dirk Peters 
 
 
Statements by African leaders clearly illustrate that they took exception at what they 
perceived as unfair treatment of African states by the coalition members. AU chairman 
Jean Ping condemned the coalition’s actions as adverse to the peace process and he also 
accused coalition members of having a hidden power agenda.8 Just before the end of the 
conflict, he criticized double standards in the West’s treatment of covert military assis-
tance: “Sometimes, when they [i.e. mercenaries in Libya] are white [and stand on the side 
of the Transitional Council], they call them ‘technical advisors’.”9 Museveni argued that 
“Western countries always use double standards. Their actions […] are emphasizing that 
might is right”.10 South African presidents Zuma and Mbeki criticized that the states pos-
sessing the military power to bomb deliberately undermined African peace efforts; they 
used their advantageous position to abuse the implementation of Resolution 1973 and to 
marginalize the AU.11 In a speech before the UN Security Council, Zuma argued that it 
was “the view of the AU that the 1973 Resolution […] was largely abused in some specific 
respects” (de Waal 2013: 367). Further, he stated that African states had not been treated 
according to the unbiased interpretation of a general principle but according to the idea 
of “might is right”12. The South African president not only criticized the lack of respect for 
international law on the part of the coalition but particularly the breach of the African 
right to self-determination. In his view, arbitrary and unfair treatment was so pronounced 
in the case of Libya that he referred to it as having set a “very dangerous precedence”, 
rhetorically asking “which African country will be next?”13 A similar critique could be 
found in a public statement signed by over 200 African intellectuals, stating that the Secu-
rity Council had allowed a coalition of powerful and willing states to usurp the implemen-
tation of Resolution 1973 and undermine the AU’s road map. Thus the Security Council 
had supported “the immensely pernicious process of the international marginalisation of 
Africa even with regard to the resolution of the problems of the Continent”.14 At the let-
ter’s formal introduction, one of its initiators, Johannesburg Professor Chris Landsberg, 
warned that “the re-colonisation of Africa is becoming a real threat.”15  
 
8  BBC News: African Union ’Ignored’ Over Libyan Crisis, http://bbc.in/1T6yVUp (accessed 26 November 
2014). 
9  As quoted by Tull/Lacher (2012: 9). 
10  Yoweri Museveni: Libya Needs Dialogue, March 2011, available at http://bit.ly/1Dwx1e5 (accessed 18 
November 2014]. 
11  Mbeki: We Should Learn from Libya’s Experiences,” Mail & Guardian Online, 5 November 2011, availa-
ble at: http://bit.ly/1ST8eYG (accessed 18 November 2014); Zuma lashes Nato for ‘abusing’ UN Resolu-
tions of Libya, Mail & Guardian, 14 June 2011, available at http://mg.co.za/article/2011-06-14-zuma-
lashes-nato-for-abusing-un-resolutions-on-libya/ (accessed 18 November 2014). 
12  Mbeki, Thabo: International Law and the Future of Africa, address at the AGM of the Law Society of the 
Northern Provinces, Sun City, 5 November 2011, available at: http://bit.ly/1eUXAhc (accessed 18 No-
vember 2014). 
13  Ibid. 
14  Open letter by “concerned Africans” condemning intervention in the African nation, August 2011, avail-
able at: http://bit.ly/1IYRCdp (accessed 18 November 2014). 
15  Over 200 African Leaders: NATO’s Libyan War Part of Plan to Recolonize Continent. Global Research, 25 
August 2011. 
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Perceptions of unfair treatment also led to defiant policies by the AU and African 
states. As the first expression of its frustration, the AU refused to participate in the Libya 
Conference on 29 March 2011 that was organized by the coalition as well as the corre-
sponding Libya Contact Group, thereby denying itself the opportunity for further influ-
ence (de Waal 2013: 371). In a clear step further, on 1 July, the AU recommended that its 
member states ignore the international arrest warrant set for Gaddafi.16 The AU defiantly 
refused to recognize the National Transitional Council as the representative for Libya 
until Gaddafi’s death on 20 October 2011. Observers were baffled over what they per-
ceived to be a low level of rationality on the part of the AU and South Africa, characteriz-
ing their behavior as “stubborn”, “obstinate” and increasingly unsustainable within the 
African Community (Tull/Lacher 2012: 8f). 
Ultimately, African critics have demanded a reassessment of the exploitation risk in-
herent in accepting the responsibility to protect (Zähringer 2013) and have been exercis-
ing harsher criticism over the contents of the norm. This distancing manifested itself in 
South Africa’s position towards the crisis in Syria. During discussions regarding UN Draft 
Resolution S/2011/612 in October 2011 – which starkly condemned the use of force by 
the Syrian government –, South Africa abstained arguing that that Resolution 1973 had 
previously been abused.17 African representatives demanded that either the AU’s proce-
dural rights be strengthened along with other regional organizations or that the AU re-
view its stance towards the R2P (Hofmann 2014: 24). 
3.2. The African Union and the protection of civilians during 
peacekeeping missions 
The Protection of Civilians (POC), as one of the goals of peacekeeping missions, gained 
attention in international discussions about peacekeeping reforms since the mid-1990s. 
Initiated by the International Committee of the Red Cross and further developed by 
various UN bodies – particularly the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights 
(OHCHR), the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of 
Field Support (DFS) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) –, the UN used this concept to respond to the increasingly multi-dimensional 
character of peacekeeping missions in domestic conflicts as well as to the shift from state-
centered understandings of security towards an understanding committed to the principle 
of human security. The UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 1999 was 
the first UN mission with the explicit mandate of protecting civilians. Since then, fourteen 
additional UN missions have operated under the POC mandate. However, the UN has 
still not been clear about what the protection of civilians means concretely, about which 
measures this concept requires or about the degree to which it transforms the concept of 
 
16  African Union opposes Warrant for Qaddafi, New York Times, 2 July 2011. 
17  See UNSC/PV.6627: 11. 
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peacekeeping missions. In the interest of protecting citizens, the Brahimi Report18 had 
called for a more robust form of peacekeeping. This was not meant to replace the three 
traditional guidelines for peacekeeping operations (consent from the conflicting parties, 
impartiality, non-use of force) but to reinterpret them. Accordingly, a demand for 
consent would not imply that conflicting parties may manipulate the implementation of 
the mandate, nor would impartiality imply that all conflicting parties be treated equally; 
rather it would mean that an operation’s obligation towards the mandate and the use of 
force serve both the purpose of self-defense and of upholding the mandate (Holt et al. 
2009). A recent concept document by the UN, while not specifically defining POC, 
describes it as a three-stepped approach that aims at initiating the political peace process, 
at protecting civilians from physical violence and at creating a benign legal and 
humanitarian environment (United Nations DPKO/DFS 2010).  
At first glance, it would seem that the AU is more open to the content of this norm be-
cause it is closely connected to traditional forms of peacekeeping. In contrast to the R2P, 
it tends to be based on the consent of local governments and, consequently, is less regime-
threatening from the viewpoint of local political elites and respects local interests and 
traditions. Upon closer inspection, however, this norm also proves to be a potential gate-
way for interventions by extra-continental actors. The shift in the doctrine of peacekeep-
ing goes far beyond cosmetic adjustments. The so-called Capstone Doctrine, formulated 
by the UN in 2008, has called POC the “core business“ of peacekeeping and the 2009 UN 
“New Horizons” document has emphasized both the robustness of peacekeeping missions 
and the significance of protecting citizens (Dembinski/Schott 2014). Here, the UN con-
tinues further down the path of decoupling the military measures it is responsible for 
from the consent of local governments. One framework document from 2011 recognizes 
that the primary responsibility to protect civilians lies with the state in question but also 
goes on to formulate the particular responsibility of the UN mission when the govern-
ment cannot or does not live up to this responsibility:  
“However, in cases where the government is unable or unwilling to fulfill its responsibility, Secu-
rity Council mandates give missions the authority of act independently to protect civilians. Bear-
ing in mind that missions operate within the principles of peacekeeping and in accordance with 
the mandate, missions are authorized to use force against any party, including elements of gov-
ernment forces, where such elements are themselves engaged in physical violence against civil-
ians” (United Nations OCHA/DPKO 2011: 3).  
This development held the potential of threatening incumbent regimes. African decision-
makers were aware of this potential and that formed the basis of their skepticism towards 
UN missions (Franke 2009: 120).19 The first practical test of the norm would indeed high-
light this risk. In 2011, around the time of the crisis in Libya, the end of President 
Gbagbo’s rule in the Ivory Coast was sealed by the robust United Nations Operation in 
 
18  The Brahimi Report, published in August 2000, had been commissioned by UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan. It contained the recommendations of a panel of high-level experts regarding the future of UN 
peace operations. 
19  See Sudanese President Bashir’s strict rejection of accepting a UN mission as successor to the AU‘s Afri-
can Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). 
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Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) mission, which had been legitimized with reference to the POC 
and operated in cooperation with French troops. At this time, West Africa’s former 
success story had been facing years of domestic conflict and violence, first erupting in 
2002 and only brought under control by the dispatch of UN blue helmet troops. The oft-
postponed presidential elections were meant to finally establish peace between the 
Gbagbo supporters that dominated the south and those of his long-time challenger 
Ouattara in the north. They, however, allowed the conflict to escalate. While independent 
election observers foresaw Ouattara winning, an election committee, dominated by 
Gbabgo’s followers, declared the incumbent president to be the winner. During the 
violent conflict that subsequently erupted, the UN did not assume the role of a neutral 
observer but supported Ouattara’s claims of electoral victory.20 It strengthened its UNOCI 
troops and activated the emergency mandate under Resolution 1975 from 30 March 2011 
with its aim of protecting civilians, particularly from the use of heavy weapons.21 Even 
though the incumbent president revoked the allowance he had originally granted for blue 
helmets to be stationed in the country, the UNOCI troops refused to withdraw. Instead, 
they attacked the weapons holds of Gbabgo’s supporters with the aid of French troops, 
forcing his resignation and finally arresting him on 11 April.  
While many African rulers may perceive the POC norm to be no less risky than R2P, 
the AU and other African organizations and states in fact supported this concept even 
after its first application. Two developments confirm the co-evolution of this protection 
norm on the global and regional levels.  
First, the AU passed a draft of African POC guidelines in 2010, which strictly adhered 
to the views of the UN’s DPKO. While a series of other AU missions were also meant to 
protect civilians in one way or another, the AU explicitly tasked the African Union Mis-
sion in Sudan (AMIS) and the African-led International Support Mission to Mali 
(AFISMA) with this goal. The protection of civilians is also the top priority in the opera-
tional planning for the African Standby Force (ASF). Plans for the ASF contain even more 
robust deployment rules for peace operations than those of the DPKO (Dembinski/Schott 
2014: 287). 
Second, contrary to the demand to have African solutions to African problems, the 
AU and other African actors seem to be pursuing a cooperative relationship with the UN 
with respect to peacekeeping operations. While the AU’s initial planning foresaw a mas-
sive intervention force of 20,000 African troops, including brigades from each of the five 
sub-regional organizations (Regional Economic Communities, RECs), current plans only 
call for a small, quickly deployable fighting unit of around 1,500 soldiers. But even this 
capacity still only exists on paper. The AU would largely be dependent on extra-
continental actors for critical capabilities such as reconnaissance and air transport. Rather 
than adhering to the policy of independent action, observers advise the AU to either limit 
itself to short-term missions that can eventually be handed over to the UN or to actively 
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assume a part in UN operations (Coleman 2011). Moreover, the AU and subregional or-
ganizations have been accepting of the trend towards more robust and independent ap-
proaches to UN missions in Africa. The final step in this development was the creation of 
the heavily armed intervention brigade for the United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO) in eastern Congo, explicitly tasked with taking 
the offensive against armed parties that were undermining the peace process (Cammaert 
2013).  
However, the AU has made its willingness to work with and be dependent on the in-
ternational community conditional on factors that draw from the justice motif. First, the 
AU understands any dependence on extra-continental organizations and states to only be 
temporary and the result of the fact that the financial resources and military capabilities 
possessed by the AU and the RECs are still deficient. In order to minimize the danger of 
financial dependence becoming political dependence, the AU has called for reliable and 
non-conditional mechanisms for financing the African peace architecture.22 In the view of 
states such as South Africa, a greater share of the financing for African security structures 
must be covered by African states in the medium term. Thus, the pan-African idea of 
independence and self-established peace has only been postponed and not abandoned.  
Despite still lacking the capacities to secure peace in Africa, the AU has insisted on be-
ing fairly involved in implementing the global norms for peacekeeping. In a report about 
the partnership between the AU and the UN during peacekeeping in 2012, the AU ex-
pressed the expectation that the Security Council “should give due consideration to the 
decisions of the AU and its PSC [Peace and Security Council] in arriving at its own deci-
sions.”23 In subsequent official positions and reports, the AU strengthened its demands 
for involvement and political control in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. Further, 
cooperation between global and regional organizations is to be informed by a new inter-
pretation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter as well as by principles such as a respect for 
African ownership and priority setting; “flexible and innovative application of the princi-
ple of subsidiarity” and “closer consultation and coordination […], based on African 
ownership and leadership”.24 
In sum, the AU has made acceptance of any robust peacekeeping missions in Africa 
dependent on a commitment from extra-continental actors to closely consult with Afri-
can bodies and give credence to their concerns and interests when implementing the 
peace doctrine, even if African actors themselves can only offer little in terms of re-
sources. The AU continues to recognize these concepts and has deepened its cooperation 
with the UN in response to the latter having broadly respected the former’s demands for 
 
22  See Report of the African Union-United Nations Panel on Modalities for Support to African Union 
Peacekeeping Operations, A/63/666; S/2008/813, 31 December 2008. 
23  Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership Between the African Union and the 
United Nations on Peace and Security: Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence, PSC/PR/ 
2.CCCVII: para. 45. 
24  Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the African Union-United Nations Partnership: The 
Need for Greater Coherence, PSC/AHG/3.CCCXCVII. 
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co-determination and control. The UN’s political course in the Ivory Coast was approved 
by ECOWAS and the AU and both ECOWAS and the AU had requested more robust ac-
tions by UNOCI. The creation of the intervention brigade for MONUSCO was initiated by 
the subregional International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and received 
support from the AU and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). South 
Africa, Tanzania and Malawi supplied the troops for the intervention force, thereby high-
lighting African demands for determining the deployment of such units on its own. As 
such, it is evident that regional participation and involvement prove to be vital to the re-
gional acceptance of robust peacekeeping missions carried out by extra-continental actors 
in Africa. 
4. The impact: summary and implications for political practice 
Up to now, research has dealt with the interactions between global and regional security 
organizations primarily from the viewpoint of norm diffusion. In contrast, this study 
highlights the importance of procedural fairness for the regional acceptance of global 
norms. It does so by cross-fertilizing international relations theory with insights from 
empirical justice research. From the perspective of justice research, international orders 
are accepted when the institutions they produce contribute to a just distribution of mate-
rial or immaterial goods, risks and burdens and when they give the affected parties 
opportunities for participation in implementing the rules of this order. As such, the 
procedural dimension exerts its own influence in this context. The probability that 
decisions will be accepted by those affected depends on the procedures that are chosen 
and the degree to which these correspond to perceived standards of justice. 
This report has illustrated these effects with two cases: the AU’s reactions to the Re-
sponsibility to Protect and to the Protection of Civilians norm. Both cases confirm the 
expectations set out by the theory of institutional justice. They both are highly similar but 
diverge with respect to a central causal factor as well as in their outcomes. Both cases have 
to do with the recognition of individual rights to protection as well as the impact that this 
recognition has on the distribution of rights, obligations and risks among states. The Afri-
can Union accepted both emergent global norms at an early stage but made acceptance of 
these norms conditional on the right to procedural co-determination. The acceptance of 
these norms was put to the test for both cases during their first implementation in 2011 
with the crises in Libya and in the Ivory Coast. For the case of Libya, the African Union 
was denied the right to involvement it had demanded. As a consequence, the AU criti-
cized the unjust way in which R2P had been implemented and began to question its ac-
ceptance of the norm altogether. In the case of the Ivory Coast, the AU was involved in all 
the decisions and therefore strengthened both its acceptance of the POC and cooperation 
in peacekeeping with extra-continental actors.  
A reconstruction of the events and an analysis of the justifications put forward by Af-
rican actors further highlighted the significance of procedural justice. In both cases, the 
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right to be involved in implementation played a central role within the African debates. 
Criticism from Africa towards the coalition’s actions taken in Libya revolved around the 
topoi of foreign determination, the violation of the pan-African right to self-deter-
mination, and exploitation. It did not, however, reflect any fundamental opposition to the 
possibility of making state leaders accountable for human rights violations. The debate in 
Africa about the POC norm following the events in the Ivory Coast revolved around co-
determination, possibilities for control and respect for African rights to self-
determination. Here it was made clear that the AU will only continue to cooperate with 
extra-continental actors as long as they recognize the principle of “African ownership and 
priority setting”. 
In contrast, the central assumptions of norm diffusion theories were not confirmed in 
the cases. The R2P and the POC norm hardly differ in their adaptability to the African 
tradition of granting state leaders immunity. They both embody similar risks to state 
leaders and, in fact, had similar results for them in the two cases. Nonetheless the AU 
distanced itself only from the R2P and not from the POC. 
The conclusions that can be drawn from these observations are clear. An ambitious in-
ternational order, whose institutions reflect the realities of globalization and are capable 
of coping with the associated demands, dependencies and externalities, will only become 
widely accepted among affected actors if it satisfies demands for justice. This requires 
agreement on the fundamental principles of distribution but also procedural fairness: 
local or regional actors need to have a say when global norms are applied in concrete cas-
es. The growth of regional security organizations reflects local actors’ insistence on co-
determination. From their perspective, this is an essential element in any just institutional 
order. Demands for involvement made by regional organizations do not put the substance 
of a global order into question. According to the theory of institutional justice, the devo-
lution of responsibility to the regional level represents an opportunity rather than a risk 
for realizing global governance. The regionalization of the architecture of global govern-
ance, for which the founding conference of the UN in San Francisco had called already in 
1944, seems to be more pertinent than ever.  
The German federal government appears to concur with this insight. It not only 
acknowledges the growing importance of regional security organizations but also sees in 
them the potential for stabilizing the global order. In its response to a parliamentary ques-
tion in 2010, the government argued that regional security organizations can "make a 
significant contribution to promoting peace and security" and can serve as "forums for 
finding solutions to regional problems”.25 Even the German Chancellor repeatedly spoke 
of the need to “enable” these organizations. The idea that that the West cannot intervene 
in all conflicts but must rely on stronger engagement on the part of other regional organi-
zations and key states has since become a standard argument by the German federal gov-
ernment. However, this argument also has a problematic subtext: that these other actors 
must be enabled to better promote Western interests. Such an understanding certainly 
 
25  Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 17/2833, 1 September 2010, p. 2 (our translation). 
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underestimates the emancipatory interests of regional actors. In the short term, a strategy 
that only relies on financial offers to attract willing local actors may prove effective. In the 
long term, strengthened regional security organizations will most likely constitute build-
ing blocks of a global order when they possess a fair degree of co-determination in the 
political processes that affect their regions. For the sake of avoiding misunderstandings, 
the German government should do two things. First, it should emphasize its willingness 
to pursue the devolution of political responsibility. And, second, it should pressure the 
EU, NATO and their member states to accept the principle of only intervening in other 
regions in accordance with the views and interests of the relevant regional security organ-
izations. Ultimately, a state pursuing a responsible foreign policy is well-advised to recog-
nize the views held by other states. 
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